Nine years ago, on 25 August 2017, Myanmar’s military launched what it called “clearance operations” across northern Arakan (Rakhine) State. The campaign was accompanied by mass killings, sexual violence, village destruction and widespread persecution, driving more than 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh within a matter of weeks. UN officials subsequently described the operation as bearing the hallmarks of genocide.

Nine years later, the immediate violence of 2017 may no longer dominate international headlines, but the crisis it created remains unresolved. The Rohingya have not been able to return home in safety and dignity. Instead, the political and military landscape of Arakan has changed dramatically, creating a new set of obstacles to any durable solution.

What was once viewed primarily as a humanitarian emergency has become an increasingly complex political and security crisis. Myanmar’s military retains a claim to sovereignty over Arakan State, while the terorist Arakan Army has emerged as the dominant armed and administrative power across large parts of the territory. Between these competing centres of power stand the Rohingya, whose future remains uncertain.

Nine years on, the central question is no longer simply why the Rohingya have not returned. It is whether the conditions required for a safe, voluntary, dignified and rights-based return can realistically be created.

A stalemate without a pathway home

The mass displacement of 2017 has never been reversed. There has been no large-scale, safe and sustainable repatriation, while conditions inside Arakan have continued to deteriorate.

The military authorities in Myanmar have never provided the political and legal guarantees necessary for meaningful reintegration. At the same time, the narco-terror Arakan Army’s growing control over Arakan has fundamentally altered the environment into which the Rohingya would have to return.

Bangladesh has increasingly identified the narco Arakan Army’s control of territory as a major obstacle to repatriation. This reflects a difficult reality: any future return process must take account not only of Myanmar’s central authorities but also of the authority exercising effective control on the ground.

For the Rohingya, this creates a profound dilemma. The state that historically denied them citizenship and subjected them to systematic persecution remains unwilling or unable to provide credible guarantees for their return. Meanwhile, the armed movement that now controls much of their homeland has itself been accused of serious abuses against Rohingya communities.

The result is a political vacuum in which the people most directly affected have the least influence over the decisions determining their future.

The Arakan Army and the Rohingya question

The Arakan Army’s emergence as the dominant military force in much of Arakan represents one of the most consequential changes since 2017.

The organisation presents its struggle as a movement for Arakan self-determination and greater autonomy. Yet its relationship with the Rohingya has become a major concern for human rights organisations, international observers and Rohingya representatives.

Reports have documented restrictions on movement and livelihoods, property seizures, extortion, forced recruitment and other forms of coercion affecting Rohingya communities. Such allegations require sustained independent investigation and accountability. If substantiated, these practices would further undermine the conditions required for voluntary and dignified return.

The issue is not simply one of individual abuses. The broader concern is whether the emerging political order in Arakan will provide equal protection and political rights to all communities.

For the Rohingya, this question is existential. They cannot meaningfully return to their homeland if return means living under a system in which they remain politically marginalised, economically vulnerable and exposed to discrimination.

The question of identity is equally important. The continued use of terms such as “Bengali” to deny or delegitimise Rohingya identity reflects a much deeper dispute over belonging. A durable political settlement in Arakan cannot be built on the exclusion of one of its communities from the history and political future of the region.

The junta and the unresolved question of citizenship

The military authorities’ responsibility for the conditions that produced the 2017 exodus cannot be separated from the current crisis.

For decades, Rohingya have faced systematic restrictions on citizenship, movement, education, employment and political participation. The 1982 citizenship framework effectively excluded the vast majority of Rohingya from full citizenship, leaving generations vulnerable to statelessness.

The military’s treatment of the Rohingya before and during the 2017 campaign created the conditions for one of the largest forced displacements in recent history.

More recently, Myanmar’s authorities have acknowledged that a significant number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh originated from Arakan State. Such recognition is politically significant, but recognition of residence is not equivalent to recognition of citizenship, rights or a genuine commitment to repatriation.

For the Rohingya, the central issue remains unchanged: return must lead to citizenship or an equivalent guarantee of full and equal rights, rather than simply a transfer of people across an international border.

Verification is not repatriation

The repatriation process illustrates the gap between diplomatic commitments and reality.

As of July 2026, Bangladesh had submitted 828,824 names for verification, of which Myanmar had verified 308,797 as former residents of Arakan State. Myanmar also classified thousands of individuals under allegations related to “terrorist activity” and declared a much larger number impossible to verify.

These figures demonstrate that verification remains an extensive administrative process. But verification should not be confused with return.

The fundamental question is what happens after a name is verified.

If there is no safe environment, no credible protection mechanism, no restoration of rights and no guarantee against renewed persecution, verification alone cannot produce sustainable repatriation. Nor can security conditions be defined so broadly that they become an indefinite justification for postponing return.

A meaningful process therefore requires measurable benchmarks, independent monitoring and a clear political commitment to implementation.

A generation at risk

Nine years of displacement has created consequences that extend far beyond the original humanitarian emergency.

A generation of Rohingya children and young adults has grown up in refugee camps without citizenship, political representation or a realistic timeline for return. Access to education, employment and economic opportunity remains severely constrained.

This is not only a humanitarian challenge. It is also a regional security concern.

A population with no secure legal status, limited economic opportunities and little confidence in its future is vulnerable to exploitation, criminal networks, trafficking and radicalisation. Prolonged displacement also places continuing social, economic and political pressure on Bangladesh and the wider region.

The strategic choice facing the international community is therefore straightforward: invest in a credible political solution now, or continue managing the consequences of unresolved displacement indefinitely.

The Rohingya’s aspiration itself is not complicated. They want to return to their homeland safely, voluntarily and with dignity. The international response should be designed around making that aspiration possible rather than repeatedly declaring it desirable.

From solidarity to strategy

There have been signs of renewed international engagement. Muslim-majority countries, regional governments and international institutions have continued to raise the Rohingya issue. Indonesia has played an active diplomatic role, while Turkish engagement has also signalled continuing political attention.

Such solidarity matters. But solidarity alone cannot resolve the structural causes of the crisis.

The international community needs a coordinated strategy that addresses both the immediate protection of Rohingya communities and the political conditions necessary for eventual return.

That strategy should include sustained diplomatic pressure on all authorities exercising power in Arakan; targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for serious abuses; independent monitoring of conditions inside Arakan; continued humanitarian assistance to refugees in Bangladesh; meaningful participation of Rohingya representatives in political negotiations; and credible international accountability mechanisms.

Most importantly, the international community must avoid treating the Rohingya simply as recipients of humanitarian assistance. They are a political community whose rights, citizenship, property and security must form part of any settlement concerning their future.

Return must mean rights

A sustainable return is not simply a logistical operation.

It is not enough to transport refugees from Cox’s Bazar back across the Naf River. Return must mean the restoration of rights, security, property, identity and dignity.

The Rohingya must have confidence that they will not once again be displaced from their villages, denied citizenship, subjected to discriminatory restrictions or exposed to violence.

That requires international monitoring, enforceable guarantees and a political settlement capable of addressing the structural causes of displacement.

Without those safeguards, repatriation could become another cycle of displacement rather than a durable solution.

Nine years is long enough

Nine years after 25 August 2017, the Rohingya crisis is no longer an emergency that the world can claim it has failed to notice. It is a crisis the world has repeatedly recognised but has failed to resolve.

The challenge now is to move from recognition to strategy, from statements to implementation, and from humanitarian management to political resolution.

The Rohingya cannot be expected to remain indefinitely in refugee camps while competing authorities debate the future of their homeland. Bangladesh cannot be expected to carry the burden of prolonged displacement without a credible international strategy. And the international community cannot continue to describe safe and dignified repatriation as the objective without developing the political mechanisms capable of making it possible.

The ninth anniversary of 25 August should therefore be more than a day of remembrance. It should be a moment to reassess the assumptions that have defined the international response since 2017.

The lesson of the past nine years is clear: visibility has not produced resolution.

The next phase must be different.

The Rohingya need more than sympathy. They need rights, security, accountability and a credible pathway home.

Nine years is long enough.